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ABSTRACT 
 
Before we can reform the financial system, we need to understand what banks do; or, 
better, what banks should do. This paper will examine the later work of Hyman Minsky 
at the Levy Institute, on his project titled “Reconstituting the United States’ Financial 
Structure.” This led to a number of Levy working papers and also to a draft book 
manuscript that was left uncompleted at his death in 1996. In this paper I focus on 
Minsky’s papers and manuscripts from 1992 to 1996 and his last major contribution (his 
Veblen-Commons Award–winning paper). 
Much of this work was devoted to his thoughts on the role that banks do and 
should play in the economy. To put it as succinctly as possible, Minsky always insisted 
that the proper role of the financial system was to promote the “capital development” of 
the economy. By this he did not simply mean that banks should finance investment in 
physical capital. Rather, he was concerned with creating a financial structure that would 
be conducive to economic development to improve living standards, broadly defined. 
Central to his argument is the understanding of banking that he developed over his career. 
Just as the financial system changed (and with it, the capitalist economy), Minsky’s 
views evolved. I will conclude with general recommendations for reform along Minskyan 
lines. 
 
Keywords: Hyman Minsky; Banks and Shadow Banks; Money Manager Capitalism; 
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Before we can reform the financial system, we need to understand what banks do, or, 
better, what banks should do. This paper will examine the later work of Hyman Minsky 
at the Levy Institute on his project titled “Reconstituting the United States’ Financial 
Structure.” This led to a number of Levy working papers and also to a draft book 
manuscript that was left uncompleted. Much of this work was devoted to his thoughts on 
the role that banks do play and should play in the economy. To put it as simply as 
possible, Minsky always insisted that the proper role of the financial system was to 
promote the “capital development” of the economy. By this he did not simply mean that 
banks should finance investment in physical capital. Rather, he was concerned with 
creating a financial structure that would be conducive to economic development to 
improve living standards, broadly defined. 
In many of his writings associated with this project Minsky emphasized six main 
points: 
 
1.  a capitalist economy is a financial system; 
2.  neoclassical economics is not useful because it denies that the financial system 
matters; 
3.  the financial structure has become much more fragile; 
4.  this fragility makes it likely that stagnation or even a deep depression is possible; 
5.  a stagnant capitalist economy will not promote capital development;  
6.  however, this can be avoided by apt reform of the financial structure in 
conjunction with apt use of fiscal powers of the government. 
 
Central to his argument is the understanding of banking that he developed over 
his career. Just as the financial system changed (and with it, the capitalist economy 
changed), Minsky’s views evolved. I will focus on his papers and manuscripts from 1992 
to his last major contribution in 1996 (Minsky [1996], his Veblen-Commons award 
paper). In this paper I will focus on Minsky’s general approach to financial institutions 
and policy; I will not provide specific recommendations for policy reform. 
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WHAT DO BANKS DO? 
 
According to Minsky, “A capitalist economy can be described by a set of interrelated 
balance sheets and income statements” (Minsky 1992a: 12). The assets on a balance sheet 
are either financial or real, held to yield income or to be sold or pledged. The liabilities 
represent a prior commitment to make payments on demand, on a specified date, or when 
some contingency occurs. Assets and liabilities are denominated in the money of account, 
and the excess of the value of assets over the value of liabilities is counted as nominal net 
worth. All economic units—households, firms, financial institutions, governments—take 
positions in assets by issuing liabilities, with margins of safety maintained for protection. 
One margin of safety is the excess of income expected to be generated by ownership of 
assets over the payment commitments entailed in the liabilities. Another is net worth—
for a given expected income stream, the greater the value of assets relative to liabilities, 
the greater the margin of safety. And still another is the liquidity of the position: if assets 
can be sold quickly or pledged as collateral in a loan, the margin of safety is bigger. Of 
course, in the aggregate all financial assets and liabilities net to zero, with only real assets 
representing aggregate net worth. These three types of margins of safety are individually 
important, and are complements not substitutes. 
If the time duration of assets exceeds that of liabilities for any unit, then positions 
must be continually refinanced. This requires “the normal functioning of various markets, 
including dependable fall-back markets in case the usual refinancing channels break 
down or become ‘too’ expensive” (1992a: 14). If disruption occurs, economic units that 
require continual access to refinancing will try to “make position” by “selling out 
position”—selling assets to meet cash commitments. Since financial assets and liabilities 
net to zero, the dynamic of a generalized sell-off is to drive asset prices toward zero, what 
Irving Fisher called a debt deflation process. Specialist financial institutions can try to 
protect markets by standing ready to purchase or lend against assets, preventing prices 
from falling. However, they will be overwhelmed by a contagion, thus, will close up shop 
and refuse to provide finance. For this reason, central bank interventions are required to 
protect at least some financial institutions by temporarily providing finance through 
lender of last resort facilities. As the creator of the high powered money, only the   4
government—central bank plus treasury—can purchase or lend against assets without 
limit, providing an infinitely elastic supply of high powered money. 
These are general statements applicable to all kinds of economic units. This is 
what Minsky meant when he said that any unit can be analyzed as if it were a “bank,” 
taking positions by issuing debt. Financial institutions are “special” in that they operate 
with very high leverage ratios: for every dollar of assets they might issue 95 cents of 
liabilities; their positions in assets really are “financed” positions. Further, some kinds of 
financial institutions specialize in taking positions in longer-term financial assets while 
issuing short-term liabilities—that is, they intentionally put themselves in the position of 
continually requiring refinancing. An extreme example would be an early 1980s-era thrift 
institution that holds 30-year fixed-rate mortgages while issuing demand deposits. Such 
an institution requires continuing access to refinancing on favorable terms because the 
interest rate it earns is fixed and because it cannot easily sell assets. This can be described 
as an illiquid position that requires access to a source of liquidity—Federal Home Loan 
Banks or the Fed.  
Still other kinds of financial institutions specialize in arranging finance by placing 
equities or debt into portfolios using markets. They typically rely on fee income rather 
than interest. In normal circumstances they would not hold these assets directly, but if 
markets became disorderly they could get stuck with assets they cannot sell (at prices 
they have promised) and thus would need access to financing of their inventories of 
stocks and bonds. Some might hold and trade assets for their own account, earning 
income and capital gains, or might do so for clients. 
Thus there are many kinds of financial institutions. Minsky distinguished among 
traditional commercial banking, investment banking, universal banking, and public 
holding company models. A traditional commercial bank makes only short-term loans 
that are collateralized by goods in production and distribution. The loans are made good 
as soon as the goods are sold—this is the model the Real Bills doctrine had in mind 
(1992c). The bank’s position is financed through the issue of short-term liabilities such as 
demand and savings deposits (or, in the 19th century, bank notes). The connections 
among the bank, the “money supply,” and real production is close—the sort of relation 
the quantity theory of money supposed. Essentially, the firm borrows to pay wages and   5
raw materials, with the bank advancing demand deposits received by workers and 
suppliers. When the finished goods are sold, firms are able to repay loans. Banks charge 
higher interest on loans than they pay on deposits—with the net interest margin providing 
bank profits. In the early postwar period it was common for banks to charge fees for 
managing deposits—this helped to pay for the payments system. However, innovation 
and competition with shadow banks forced banks to make interest payments on deposit 
accounts—reducing bank profits as banks not only had to pay interest on their liabilities 
but also had to operate a costly payments system. This helps to explain the high leverage 
ratio of banking: to keep the differential between loan and deposit rates low the bank 
needs a high asset-to-capital ratio in order to earn an acceptable profit rate on owner’s 
equity. Alternatively, banks would need to make the payments system a profitable 
operation—charging fees for deposit accounts and payments. However, if there are viable 
alternatives—such as cash—there will be limits to a bank’s ability to squeeze profits out 
of the payments system. High bank leverage is the trade-off for keeping interest rate 
differentials low. 
If deposits are to maintain parity (with each other and with cash), losses on assets 
must be very small because the commercial bank’s equity must absorb all asset value 
reductions. It is the duty of the commercial banker to be skeptical; as Minsky loved to 
say, a banker’s cliché is “I’ve never seen a pro forma I didn’t like”—borrowers always 
present a favorable view of their prospects. This is why careful underwriting is essential. 
While it is true that loans can be made against collateral (the goods in the process of 
production and distribution), a successful bank would almost never be forced to take the 
collateral. A bank should not operate like a pawn shop. As Martin Mayer (2010) says, 
banking has always been a business where profits come over time as borrowers pay 
principal and interest. He alludes to the morality of a loan officer, whose success depends 
on the success of the borrower. It goes without saying that betting on the failure of one’s 
borrower is inimical to the duties of a commercial bank. 
There is a very important but subtle point made by Minsky regarding the ability of 
the commercial bank to “force” a surplus from whence comes gross capital income 
(profits and interest). If we take the simplest economy, the commercial bank finances the 
total wage bill by extending loans and creating deposits. Only a portion of the wages will   6
be received by workers producing consumer goods—what we can call wage goods. The 
other portion of wages is paid to workers producing investment goods, yet these workers 
will spend their income on wage goods. Producers of the wage goods will thus receive 
gross profits equal to the wages paid in the investment goods sector. While it appears to 
any single firm that its profits are attributable to entrepreneurial finesse (good 
management and marketing, market power, productivity of its labor and capital, and so 
on), this can only determine the distribution of profits among firms. If there is no 
production of investment goods, then there will be no aggregate profits (if one firm 
makes profits this is identically equal to losses of other firms). In conditions of depressed 
expectations of future profitability, investment collapses and so does aggregate profit 
because workers in the investment sector will lose their jobs.  
The banker holds the key—he is the “ephor of capitalism,” as Minsky’s original 
dissertation advisor, Schumpeter, put it—because not only do entrepreneurs have to be 
sufficiently optimistic to invest, they must also find a banker willing to advance the wage 
bill to produce investment output. Note that this ability to force a surplus (and to 
accumulate capital) is separate from the issue of financing ownership of capital goods. As 
mentioned above, the fundamental purpose of a financial system is to support the capital 
development of the economy. By financing the wage bill of workers in the investment 
goods sector, commercial banks are promoting the capital development of the economy 
even if they do not actually provide finance for position-taking in investment goods. 
Hence, we can separate the issue of producing capital goods from ownership of them. For 
Schumpeter, and for Minsky, the “ephor of capitalism” breaks the simple circuit of 
production and consumption of wage goods—in which banks simply finance production 
of consumer goods by workers whose consumption exactly exhausts the wage bill 
required to produce them. In other words, the ephor allows production of profits by 
financing spending by those not directly involved in producing consumption goods. 
These profits are “saved” in the form of accumulated capital goods.  
In the pre-1870 period that Minsky called the “commercial capitalism stage,” 
investment goods were owned directly by individual entrepreneurs and purchased out of 
accumulated savings (from profits). In the next stage, “finance capitalism,” capital goods 
had become too expensive for individual ownership so that the corporate form emerged.   7
External finance in the form of shares and bonds financed the ownership of capital assets. 
This leads to the second type of bank, the investment bank. The function of an investment 
bank is to provide the external finance needed to put the produced capital goods into the 
hands of the entrepreneur. Using our simple model, the investment bank intermediates 
between recipients of the financial surplus created in production (by the spending of 
workers in the investment sector) and the entrepreneur who wishes to hold the produced 
capital goods. Note that while this is often framed as an intermediation between “savers 
and investors” this should not be interpreted as “saving finances investment”—the saving 
(out of profits) is actually created by the production of the investment goods and the 
subsequent consumption by workers from the investment sector. In other words, this is 
about financing ownership of the capital goods, not production of them. Of course, the 
production of investment goods will not normally occur unless it is fairly certain that they 
will be sold—capital goods are typically produced on order for an entrepreneur who has 
already obtained a commitment from an investment bank to provide finance once the 
goods are ready.  
For illustrative purposes we can distinguish between two investment banking 
models. In the first, the investment bank holds the equities and bonds issued by the 
corporation that requires financing of its capital stock. The investment bank in turn 
finances its position by issuing debt and shares held by households. If the investment 
bank’s debt is shorter term than the assets it holds, it must be able to refinance its position 
as discussed above. Mayer’s aphorism still applies: the investment bank will be 
successful only to the extent that its corporate borrowers are successful. Alternatively the 
investment bank simply places debt and equities of corporations into the portfolios of 
households. This model of investment banking does not require borrower success; rather 
than asking whether the borrower will repay the loan, this investment banker only worries 
whether he can sell the stocks and bonds he needs to place. Underwriting is no longer an 
essential activity—indeed, careful underwriting can be ensured only if the households 
that purchase the debt and equity marketed by the investment bank have recourse. Of 
course, investment banks can combine both models—owning only the equities and bonds 
that households do not wish to hold. Today in the United States, households mostly hold 
the bonds and equities of firms only indirectly, through professionally managed funds:    8
 
Most households that own wealth own it in the form of interests 
in funds, mutual, pension, money market, trust, and insurance 
reserves and these funds are the major holder of the liabilities of 
the largest companies. As a result of the vast accumulations in 
these funds a new type of financial capitalism has emerged. The 
managers of such funds are mainly interested in what has been 
called total returns, which are short-term returns of dividends 
and the change in the values in the market of the securities. The 
various manias, from conglomeration to leveraged buy outs, that 
have swept capitalism in the past years have reflected the power 
of these funds. Let us call the 1990s version of the capital 
market/commercial bank financial structure money manager 
capitalism. (Minsky 1992c pp. 37–38) 
 
We will return to these issues below when we examine Minsky’s final stage of 
capitalism, the “money manager phase.”  
This second investment bank model is often referred to as a “markets” model as 
opposed to a “banks” model because it largely relies on investment banks selling 
corporate debt to households and fund managers. The development of the asset-backed 
securities markets is the best example, in which originating banks (of a wide variety) 
package loans (again, of a wide variety) to serve as the collateral behind marketed 
securities. Originally the idea was that originating banks would shift the risks off their 
balance sheets, but they ended up retaining interests in a lot of the securities—again a 
point we will return to. 
Minsky analyzed two alternative arrangements to the commercial bank plus 
investment bank model (Minsky 1992c). The first is the universal bank model that was 
adopted in Germany and Japan; the second is the Public Holding Company (PHC) model. 
A universal bank model combines commercial banking and investment banking functions 
in a bank that provides both short-term lending and long-term funding of the operations 
of firms. It issues liabilities, including demand deposits, to households and buys the 
stocks and bonds of firms. A universal bank might also provide a variety of other 
financial services, including mortgage lending, retail brokering, and insurance. The final 
alternative is the PHC model in which the holding company owns various types of 
financial firms with some degree of separation provided by firewalls. The PHC holds 
stocks and bonds of firms and finances positions by borrowing from banks, the market, 
and the Treasury. Minsky argued that the development of money manager capitalism has   9
led to a convergence of these three models. This prescient recognition in 1992 helps to 
explain the current crisis, in which problems with mortgages first brought down 
investment banks and then the short-term lending market (such as commercial paper) that 
bank holding companies had relied upon for financing their positions in assets—
including collateralized debt obligations held by “special purpose vehicle” subsidiaries. 
Note how investment banking separates the proximate owners of the real capital 
assets (the corporation) from the ultimate owners (the investment bank in the first model, 
or the households in the second). In fact, things can quickly become very complicated, 
with a “complex combination of equity shares, bonds, mortgages, leases and bank loans” 
that “finance the control of the capital assets that are needed for production” (Minsky 
1992c: 32). All of the liabilities of the corporation are assets of other economic units, 
entailing “dated, demand, or contingent claims to the cash flows that the operations of the 
unit, operations that depend upon the use of the physical assets, generate” (Minsky 
1992c). Today’s production of investment goods creates the profits that validate 
yesterday’s decision to invest. Since today’s financing of ownership of positions in 
capital assets sets up a stream of commitments to pay over a series of tomorrows, if 
production of investment goods does not take place in those tomorrows, the positions 
taken today will not be validated. “This intertemporal nature of the financial relations of a 
capitalist economy is the essential reason why capitalist economies are likely not to 
behave in a nice equilibrium-seeking way and why markets need to be regulated and 
controlled” (Minsky 1992c). 
The layering of financial commitments on top of real assets that generate income 
creates a new kind of capitalism, one in which ownership positions need to be continually 
validated. This is in sharp contrast to the commercial capitalism stage in which capital 
assets are owned outright so that an occasional failure to generate gross capital income 
does not threaten the entrepreneur’s existence. As we shall see, the finance capitalism 
stage is quite different because a shortfall of gross profits sets in motion behaviors that 
not only threaten the individual firm, but that can threaten the entire system with debt 
deflation dynamics. 
According to Minsky, that phase of capitalism—what he called (after Hilferding) 
finance capitalism—collapsed in the Great Depression. Government was too small to   10
offset the collapse of gross capital income that followed the Great Crash of 1929. After 
WWII we emerged with a new stage of capitalism, managerial welfare-state capitalism, 
with a government so large that its deficit could expand sufficiently in a downturn to 
offset the swing of investment. This maintained the aggregate surplus, allowing debts to 
be serviced. In addition, we had an array of New Deal reforms that strengthened the 
financial system, separating investment banks from commercial banks, and putting in 
place government guarantees such as deposit insurance. But, as Minsky said, stability is 
destabilizing. The relatively high rate of economic growth, plus the relative stability of 
the financial system, over time encouraged innovations that subverted the New Deal 
constraints. In addition, the financial wealth (and private debt) grew on trend, producing 
huge sums of money under professional management. Minsky called this stage the 
“money manager phase” of capitalism. We will turn to banking in that stage next. 
 
BANKING IN THE MONEY MANAGER PHASE OF CAPITALISM  
 
In an important sense, money manager capitalism represents a return to the prewar 
finance capitalism stage. So let us first briefly look at the condition of the financial 
system in 1929, on the precipice of the Great Crash. 
We have already examined the rise of external finance of a firm’s capital assets. 
As J.M. Keynes famously described in his General Theory, separation of nominal 
ownership (holders of shares) from management of enterprise meant that prices of 
equities would be influenced by “whirlwinds of optimism and pessimism.” Worse, as 
John Kenneth Galbraith (2009) makes clear, stocks could be manipulated by insiders—
Wall Street’s financial institutions—through a variety of “pump and dump” schemes. 
Indeed, the 1929 crash resulted from excesses promoted by investment trust subsidiaries 
of Wall Street’s banks. Since the famous firms like Goldman Sachs were partnerships, 
they did not issue stock; hence they put together investment trusts that would purport to 
hold valuable equities in other firms (often in other affiliates, which sometimes held no 
stocks other than those in Wall Street trusts) and then sell shares in these trusts to a 
gullible public.    11
Effectively, trusts were an early form of mutual fund, with the “mother” 
investment house investing a small amount of capital in their offspring, highly leveraged 
using other people’s money. Goldman and others would then whip up a speculative fever 
in shares, reaping capital gains. However, trust investments amounted to little more than 
pyramid schemes (the worst kind of what Minsky called Ponzi finance)—there was very 
little in the way of real production or income associated with all this trading in paper. 
Indeed, as Galbraith showed, the “real” economy was long past its peak—there were no 
“fundamentals” to drive the Wall Street boom. Inevitably, it collapsed and a “debt 
deflation” began as everyone tried to sell out of their positions in stocks—causing prices 
to collapse. Spending on the “real economy” suffered and we were off to the Great 
Depression.  
Again, as described above, this second type of investment bank (which 
intermediates shares between the issuing corporation and the household owners) opens up 
the possibility that underwriting will not be well done. All of this will sound familiar to 
anyone who has studied the dot-com, commodities, and real estate bubbles of the past 
decade (See Wray [2008a and 2008b]). While many point to the demise of Glass Steagall 
separation of banking by function, the problem really was the demise of underwriting. 
Below we will visit Minsky’s views on Glass Steagall. The New Deal’s reaction to the 
Great Crash was to prohibit commercial banks from handling equities—a reasonable 
response to the excesses of the 1929 boom. The banking crisis had been made very much 
worse because banks were caught holding stocks with little or no value, many of them 
issued by these investment trusts. Ironically, even the investment banks that had created 
the trusts got burned because they also held the worthless stocks. In some cases, this was 
because they got caught holding stocks they were trying to sell when the market crashed. 
However, many had invested in the pyramid schemes they created—following the greater 
fool theory that they would recognize the peak and sell out before the crash. Again, that 
will sound familiar to anyone who has studied the 2007 crisis—the banks that originated 
the toxic waste for sale to customers got caught holding it for precisely the same reasons.  
In other words, the problem and solution is not really related to functional 
separation, but rather to the erosion of underwriting standards that is inevitable over a run 
of good times when a trader mentality triumphs. If a bank believes it can offload   12
questionable assets before values are questioned, its incentive to do proper underwriting 
is reduced. And if asset prices are generally rising on trend, the bank will try to share in 
the gains by taking positions in the assets. This is why the current calls by some for a 
return to Glass Steagall separation or to force banks to “put skin in the game” by holding 
some fraction of the toxic waste they produce are both wrong-headed. In the final section 
we will discuss some policies that could instead discipline underwriting standards. 
Minsky argued that the convergence of the various types of banks within the 
umbrella bank holding company, and within shadow banks, was fueled by growth of 
money manager capitalism. It was also encouraged by the expansion of the government 
safety net, as Minsky (1992c: 39) remarked: “This convergence is also reflected in the 
United States by a proliferation of government endorsements of private obligations.” 
Indeed, it is impossible to tell the story of the current crisis without reference to the 
implicit guarantee given by the Treasury to the mortgage market through its GSEs 
(Fannie and Freddie), through the student loan market (Sallie), and even through the 
“Greenspan Put” and the Bernanke “Great Moderation”—that gave the impression to 
markets that the government would never let markets fail. In the aftermath of the crisis, 
the government’s guarantee of liabilities went far beyond FDIC-insured deposits to cover 
larger denomination deposits as well as money market funds, and the Fed extended lender 
of last resort facilities to virtually all financial institutions (with bailouts also going to 
auto companies, and so on). This really was a foregone conclusion once Glass Steagall 
was gutted and investment banking, commercial banking, and all manner of financial 
services were consolidated in a single financial “big box” superstore with explicit 
government guarantees over a portion of the liabilities. Financial institution indebtedness 
grew to some 120% of GDP—the leveraging and layering of national income that 
Minsky addressed—with complex and unknowable linkages among chartered banks and 
mostly unregulated institutions. It was always clear that if problems developed 
somewhere in a highly integrated system, the Treasury and Fed would be on the hook to 
rescue the shadow banks, too.  
By the 1990s the big investment banks were still partnerships so they found it 
impossible to directly benefit from a run-up of the stock market, similar to the situation in 
1929. An investment bank could earn fees by arranging initial public offerings for start-  13
ups, and it could trade stocks for others or for its own account. This offered the 
opportunity to exploit inside information, to manipulate the timing of trades, or to push 
the dogs onto clients. But in the euphoric irrational exuberance of the late 1990s that 
looked like chump change. How could an investment bank’s management get a bigger 
share of the action? 
In 1999 the largest partnerships went public to enjoy the advantages of stock issue 
in a boom. Top management was rewarded with stocks—leading to the same pump-and-
dump incentives that drove the 1929 boom. To be sure, traders like Robert Rubin (who 
would become Treasury secretary) had already come to dominate firms like Goldman. 
Traders necessarily take a short view—you are only as good as your last trade. More 
importantly, traders take a zero-sum view of deals: there will be a winner and a loser, 
with the investment bank pocketing fees for bringing the two sides together. Better yet, 
the investment bank would take one of the two sides—the winning side, of course—and 
pocket the fees and collect the winnings. Why would anyone voluntarily become the 
client, knowing that the deal was ultimately zero-sum and that the investment bank would 
have the winning hand? No doubt there were some clients with an outsized view of their 
own competence or luck, but most customers were wrongly swayed by investment bank’s 
good reputation. From the perspective of hired management, the purpose of a good 
reputation is to exploit it—what William Black (2005) calls “control fraud.” 
Before this transformation, trading profits were a small part of investment bank 
revenues—for example, before it went public, only 28% of Goldman’s revenues came 
from trading and investing activities. That is now about 80% of revenue. While many 
think of Goldman and JP Morgan (the remaining investment banks since the demise of 
Lehman, Bear, and Merrill, which all folded or were absorbed) as banks, they are really 
more like huge hedge funds, albeit very special ones that now hold bank charters, granted 
during the crisis when investment banks were having trouble refinancing positions in 
assets—giving them access to the Fed’s discount window and to FDIC insurance. That, in 
turn, lets them obtain funding at near-zero interest rates. Indeed, in 2009 Goldman spent 
only a little over $5 billion to borrow, versus $26 billion in interest expenses in 2008—a 
$21 billion subsidy thanks to its access to cheap, government-insured deposits. The two 
remaining investment banks were also widely believed to be “backstopped” by the   14
government—under no circumstances would they be allowed to fail—keeping stock 
prices up. However, after the SEC began to investigate some of Goldman’s practices, that 
belief was thrown into doubt, causing share prices to plummet (See Wray [2010]). 
In some ways, things were even worse than they had been in 1929 because the 
investment banks had gone public—issuing equities directly into the portfolios of 
households and indirectly to households through the portfolios of managed money. It was 
thus not a simple matter of having Goldman or Citibank jettison one of its unwanted 
offspring—problems with the stock or other liabilities of the behemoth financial 
institutions would rattle Wall Street and threaten the solvency of pension funds and other 
invested funds. This finally became clear to the authorities after the problems with Bear 
and Lehman. The layering and linkages among firms—made opaque by over-the-counter 
derivatives such as credit default swaps—made it impossible to let them fail one-by-one, 
as failure of one would bring down the whole house of cards. The problem we now face 
is that total financial liabilities in the United States amount to about five times GDP 
(versus 300% in 1929)—so that every dollar of income must service five dollars of debt. 
That is an average leverage ratio of five-times income. That is one (scary) way to 
measure leverage, for as Minsky and Mayer argue, this is, historically, the important 
measure for bank profitability—which ultimately must be linked to repayment of 
principle and interest out of income flows.  
Another measure, of course, is the ratio of debt-to-assets. This became 
increasingly important during the real estate boom, when mortgage brokers would find 
finance for 100% or more of the value of a mortgage, on the expectation that real estate 
prices would rise. That is a trader’s, not a banker’s, perspective because it relies on either 
sale of the asset or refinancing. While a traditional banker might feel safe with a capital 
leverage ratio of 12 or 20—with careful underwriting to ensure that the borrower would 
be able to make payments—for a mortgage originator or securitizer who has no plans to 
hold the mortgage what matters is the ability to place the security. Many considerations 
then come into play, including prospective asset price appreciation, credit ratings, 
monoline and credit default swap “insurance,” and “overcollateralization” (markets for 
the lower tranches of securities). We need not go deeply into the details of these complex 
instruments. What is important is that income flows take a back seat in such   15
arrangements, and acceptable capital leverage ratios are much higher. For money 
managers, capital leverage ratios are 30 and reach up to several hundred. But even these 
large numbers hide the reality that risk exposures can be very much higher because many 
commitments are not reported on balance sheets. There are unknown and essentially 
unquantifiable risks entailed in counterparties—for example, in supposedly hedged credit 
default swaps in which one sells “insurance” on suspected toxic waste and then offsets 
risks by buying “insurance” that is only as good as the counterparty. Because balance 
sheets are linked in highly complex and uncertain ways, failure of one counterparty can 
spread failures throughout the system. All of these financial instruments ultimately rest 
on the shoulders of some homeowner trying to service her mortgage out of income 
flows—on average with $5 of debts and only $1 of income to service them. As Minsky 
argued, “National income and its distribution is the ‘rock’ upon which the capitalist 
financial structure rests” (Minsky 1992d: part III, p. 2). Unfortunately, that rock is 
holding up a huge financial structure and the trend toward concentration of income and 
wealth at the top makes it ever more difficult to support the weight of the debt. 
In an ideal world, a lot of the debts will cancel, the homeowner will not lose her 
job, and the FIRE sector can continue to force 40% of all corporate profits in its direction. 
But that is not the world in which we live. In our little slice of the blue planet, the 
homeowner missed some payments, the MBSs issued against her mortgage got 
downgraded, the monoline insurers went bust, the credit default swaps went bad when 
AIG failed, the economy slowed, and the homeowner lost her job and then her house, real 
estate prices collapsed, and in spite of its best efforts to save money manager capitalism, 
the federal government has not yet found a way out of the morass. 
 
BANKING ON CRISIS? THE RISE OF CASINO CAPITALISM 
 
Minsky’s writings in the early 1992 were remarkably prescient; while he was addressing 
the banking crisis at that time (which followed the 1980s S&L crisis), most of his points 
could be made about the continuing evolution of the financial structure, which finally 
collapsed in 2007. He warned that the early postwar financial conservativism had given 
way to money manager capitalism that “ushered in a new era of pervasive casino   16
capitalism,” with the leveraged buy-outs of the late 1980s serving as a good example of 
the excesses. Much of that boom was driven by pension funds “both as suppliers of the 
equity base for leveraged buy outs and as the takers of the high yield bonds (junk bonds) 
[…] Systemic over indebtedness may well be a legacy of pension funds in the United 
States” (Minsky 1992d: part II, p. 9). He argued that the decrease in the power of banks 
and the concomitant rise of the power of managed money “has little to do with the 
movement to deregulate banks and other financial institutions” (Minsky 1992d: part II, p. 
9). Instead he blamed the 1979–82 Volcker experiment in monetarism that wiped out 
bank and thrift equity, payments systems innovations (such as electronic funds transfers 
and credit cards) that took away cheap deposit sources of bank funds, and the “change in 
the international clout of the United States” as far more important (Minsky 1992d: part II, 
p. 12). Thus, Minsky attributed the transformation of the financial sector away from 
banking and toward managed money that occurred over a long period to complex—and 
mostly endogenous—factors. While deregulation (in the early 1980s, and then again in 
the late 1990s after Minsky’s death) played an important role, Minsky insisted that this 
was of secondary importance. 
On the eve of the 2007 crash, we no longer had any sharp distinction between 
investment banking and commercial banking—and repeal of the Glass Steagall Act in 
1999 eliminated any remaining barriers. Banking was largely organized into holding 
companies with subsidiaries that could engage across the spectrum of financial activities. 
Some activities were farmed-out to independent or quasi-independent specialists 
(independent mortgage brokers, special purpose vehicles). Many financial services were 
supposedly taken out of financial institutions to be performed by “markets.” However, 
this was more apparent than real because the dominant financial institutions controlled 
those markets and set prices of financial assets (often using complex and proprietary 
models). This is probably what Minsky meant when he said that money manager 
capitalism had integrated the various models of banks. For our purposes, there was a 
handful of behemoth financial institutions that provided the four main financial services: 
commercial banking (short-term finance for business and government), payments 
services (for households, firms, and government), investment banking (long-term finance 
for firms and government), and mortgages (residential and commercial real estate). A lot   17
of the debts were securitized and ultimately held in pension, university endowment, and 
sovereign wealth funds. Note that if anything, the largest institutions have consolidated 
their power as a result of the crisis, largely through government help. 
The originate to distribute model virtually eliminated underwriting, to be replaced 
by a combination of property valuation by assessors who were paid to overvalue real 
estate, by credit ratings agencies who were paid to overrate securities, by accountants 
who were paid to ignore problems, and by monoline insurers whose promises were not 
backed by sufficient loss reserves. As Jan Kregel (2008) has argued, the mortgages were 
Ponzi from the very beginning—they required rising real estate prices as well as 
continual access to refinancing because borrowers did not have the capacity to service the 
loans. Much of the activity was actually off the balance sheets of banks and thrifts, with 
mortgage brokers arranging for finance, with investment banks packaging the securities, 
and with the “shadow banks” or “managed money” holding the securities. While Fannie 
and Freddie have been subjected to much ridicule, in truth neither of them made or 
arranged any of the mortgages, and they only began to purchase the toxic securities 
because that was all that markets were selling. Still, when delinquencies and defaults on 
mortgages rose, problems immediately came back to the banks through several avenues: 
they were stuck with securities they were trying to sell, they had sold credit default 
“insurance” or had provided “buy-back” guarantees on securities they had sold, they had 
special purpose vehicles with loads of bad assets, and they could not refinance positions 
in assets because the market for short-term debt had practically disappeared. But that was 
only the beginning of problems for the financial sector. 
Above we mentioned that the investment banks in the late 1920s stock market 
boom had used “pump and dump” schemes to push overpriced stocks in their own 
subsidiaries into portfolios of clients; in many cases, the investment banks themselves got 
caught up in the whirlwinds of speculative fever, taking positions in what they knew to be 
pyramid schemes. Similar shenanigans took place over the past decade as traders adopted 
the “greater fool” theory: sure the whole thing would inevitably collapse, but each trader 
thought he could sell out position at the peak, shunting toxic assets off to the greater 
fools. Just as in 1929, traders found that selling into a collapsing market meant losses, 
and falling asset prices meant collateral calls with no access to finance.    18
In the modern era, it is not enough to put together Ponzi pyramid schemes or to 
sell trash to gullible customers. While investment banking today is often compared to a 
casino, that is not really fair. A casino is heavily regulated and while probabilities favor 
the house, gamblers can win 48% of the time. When a firm approaches an investment 
bank to arrange for finance, the modern investment bank immediately puts together two 
teams. The first team arranges finance on the most favorable terms for their bank that 
they can manage to push onto their client. The second team puts together bets that the 
client will not be able to service its debt. Even brokers do not currently have a fiduciary 
responsibility to take their client’s best interests into account when selling them assets. 
Magnetar, a hedge fund, actually sought the very worst tranches of mortgage-backed 
securities, almost single-handedly propping up the market for toxic waste that it could put 
into CDOs sold on to “investors” (I use that term loosely because these were suckers to 
the “nth” degree; see Wray [2010] for details and references). It then bought credit 
default insurance (from, of course, AIG) to bet on failure. By 2008, 96% of the CDO 
deals arranged by Magnetar were in default—as close to a sure bet as financial markets 
will ever find. In other words, the financial institution often bets against households, 
firms, and governments—and loads the dice against them—with the bank winning when 
its customers fail. We are very far, indeed, from Martin Mayer’s vision of banking, or 
Hyman Minsky’s banks that finance the capital development of the economy. 
In a case recently prosecuted by the SEC, Goldman created synthetic CDOs that 
placed bets on toxic waste MBSs. (Goldman agreed to pay a fine of $550 million, without 
admitting guilt, although it did admit to a “mistake.” Again, see Wray [2010] for details.) 
A synthetic CDO does not actually hold any mortgage securities—it is simply a pure bet 
on a bunch of MBSs. The purchaser is betting that those MBSs will not go bad, but there 
is an embedded CDS that allows the other side to bet that the MBSs will fall in value, in 
which case the CDS “insurance” pays off. Note that the underlying mortgages do not 
need to go into default or even fall into delinquency. To make sure that those who “short” 
the CDO (those holding the CDS) get paid sooner rather than later, all that is required is a 
downgrade by credit rating agencies. The trick, then, is to find a bunch of MBSs that 
appear to be overrated and place a bet they will be downgraded. The propensity of credit 
raters to give high ratings to junk assets is well-known, indeed assured by paying them to   19
do so. Since the underlying junk is actually, well, junk, downgrades are also assured. 
Betting against the worst junk you can find is a good deal—if you can find a buyer to 
take the bet. 
The theory behind shorting is that it lets you hedge risky assets in your portfolio, 
and it aids in price discovery. The first requires that you’ve actually got the asset you are 
shorting, the second relies on the belief in the efficacy of markets. In truth, these markets 
are highly manipulated by insiders, subject to speculative fever, and mostly over-the-
counter. That means that initial prices are set by sellers. Even in the case of MBSs—that 
actually have mortgages as collateral—buyers usually do not have access to essential data 
on the loans that will provide income flows. Once we get to tranches of MBSs, to CDOs 
(squared and cubed), and on to synthetic CDOs, we have leveraged and layered those 
underlying mortgages to a degree that it is pure fantasy to believe that markets can 
efficiently price them. Indeed, that was the reason for credit ratings, monoline insurance, 
and credit default swaps (CDS). CDSs that allow bets on synthetics that are themselves 
bets on MBSs held by others serve no social purpose—they are neither hedges nor price 
discovery mechanisms. 
The most famous shorter of MBSs is John Paulson, who approached Goldman to 
see if the firm could create some toxic synthetic CDOs that he could bet against. Of 
course, that would require that Goldman could find clients willing to buy junk CDOs. 
According to the SEC, Goldman let Paulson increase the probability of success by 
allowing him to suggest particularly risky securities to include in the CDOs. Goldman 
arranged 25 such deals, named Abacus, totaling about $11 billion. Out of 500 CDOs 
analyzed by UBS, only two did worse than Goldman’s Abacus. Just how toxic were these 
CDOs? Only five months after creating one of these Abacus CDOs, the ratings of 84% of 
the underlying mortgages had been downgraded. By betting against them, Goldman and 
Paulson won—Paulson pocketed $1 billion on the Abacus deals; he made a total of $5.7 
billion shorting mortgage-based instruments in a span of two years. This is not genius 
work—an extraordinarily high percent of CDOs that are designed to fail will fail. 
Paulson has not been accused of fraud—while he is accused of helping to select 
the toxic waste, he has not been accused of misleading investors in the CDOs he bet 
against. Goldman, on the other hand, never told investors that the firm was creating these   20
CDOs specifically to meet the demands of Paulson for an instrument to allow him to bet 
against them. The truly surprising thing is that Goldman’s customers actually met with 
Paulson as the deals were assembled—but Goldman never informed them that Paulson 
was the shorter of the CDOs they were buying! While Goldman admitted it should have 
provided more information to buyers, its defense was that: a) these clients were big boys; 
and b) Goldman also lost money on the deals because it held a lot of the Abacus CDOs. 
In other words, Goldman not only withheld crucial information, but it is also sufficiently 
incompetent to buy CDOs that it let Paulson put together with the explicit purpose of 
betting on failure. If that is not exploitation of reputation by Goldman’s management, I 
do not know what would qualify. 
By the way, in the AIG bail-out by the government, $12.9 billion was passed-
through to Goldman because AIG provided the CDSs that allowed Goldman and Paulson 
to short Abacus CDOs. So AIG was also duped, as was Uncle Sam. I have argued (Wray 
2010) that we should not take Goldman’s claim that it lost money on these deals too 
seriously. It must be remembered that when Hank Paulson ran Goldman, it was bullish on 
real estate; through 2006 it was accumulating MBSs and CDOs—including early Abacus 
CDOs. It then slowly dawned on Goldman that it was horribly exposed to what was 
turning out to be toxic waste. At that point it started shorting the market, including the 
Abacus CDOs it held and was still creating. Thus, while it might be true that Goldman 
could not completely hedge its positions so that it got caught holding junk, that was not 
for lack of trying to push risks onto its clients. The market crashed before Goldman found 
a sufficient supply of buyers to allow it to short everything it held. 
Previously, Goldman helped Greece to hide its government debt, then bet against 
the debt—another fairly certain bet since debt ratings would likely fall if the hidden debt 
was discovered. Goldman took on U.S. states as clients (including California, New 
Jersey, and nine other states), earning fees for placing their debts, and then encouraged 
other clients to bet against state debt—using its knowledge of the precariousness of state 
finances to market the instruments that facilitated the shorts. To be fair, Goldman is not 
alone—all of this appears to be common business procedure. In early spring 2010, a 
court-appointed investigator issued his report on the failure of Lehman. Lehman engaged 
in a variety of “actionable” practices (potentially prosecutable as crimes). Interestingly, it   21
hid debt using practices similar to those employed by Goldman to hide Greek debt. The 
investigator also showed how the prices by Lehman on its assets were set—and subject to 
rather arbitrary procedures that could result in widely varying values. But most 
importantly, the top management, as well as Lehman’s accounting firm (Ernst&Young), 
signed off on what the investigator said was “materially misleading” accounting. That is a 
go-to-jail crime if proven. The question is why would a top accounting firm, as well as 
Lehman’s CEO, Richard Fuld, risk prison in the post-Enron era (similar accounting fraud 
brought down Enron’s accounting firm, and resulted in Sarbanes-Oxley legislation that 
requires a company’s CEO to sign off on company accounts)? There are two answers. 
First, it is possible that such behavior is so wide-spread that no accounting firm could 
retain top clients without agreeing to overlook it. Second, these practices may be so 
pervasive and enforcement and prosecution thought to be so lax that CEOs and 
accounting firms have no fear. I have argued that both answers are correct (Wray 2010). 
The purpose of this discussion is not to single out any particular firm, nor is it to 
argue that such behavior is the only thing that investment banks do. Indeed, as a number 
of “kiss and tell” accounts (such as those by Das 2006 and Bookstaber 2007) show, 
questionable treatment of clients by investment banks has a long history. The only thing 
that appears to be relatively new is the dominance of traders and trading at these firms, as 
well as the zero-sum and short-termism mentality that creates a particularly unhealthy 
relationship between investment banks and their customers.  
In the following section we return to Minsky’s insights on banking, trying to 
identify what banks should be doing in our new millennium. The previous discussion 
should make it pretty clear that banking as practiced in the first decade of the new 
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WHAT SHOULD BANKS DO? 
 
Let us first enumerate the essential functions to be provided by the financial system. 
 
1. A safe and sound payments system; 
2. short-term loans to households and firms, and, possibly, to state and local 
governments; 
3. a safe and sound housing finance system; 
4. a range of financial services including insurance, brokerage, and retirement 
services; and 
5. long-term funding of positions in expensive capital assets. 
 
Obviously there is no reason why any single institution should provide all of these 
services, although as discussed above the long-run trend has been to consolidate a wide 
range of services within the affiliates of a bank holding company. The New Deal reforms 
had separated institutions by function (and state laws against branching provided 
geographic constraints). Minsky recognized that Glass Steagall had already become 
anachronistic by the early 1990s. He insisted that any reforms must take account of the 
accelerated innovations in both financial intermediation and the payments mechanism. As 
discussed above, he believed these changes were largely market-driven and not due to 
deregulation. The demise of commercial banking and the rise of shadow banking was 
mostly a consequence of the transition to money manager capitalism. 
In his draft book manuscript he dealt in detail with a Treasury proposal for 
“modernizing” the financial system. Briefly, this proposal made recommendations for 
“safer, more competitive banks,” by “strengthening” deposit insurance, weakening Glass 
Steagall, weakening state limits on branching, allowing corporations to own banks, and 
consolidating regulatory and supervisory functions in the Treasury at the expense of 
reduction of the role of the Fed. Minsky argued that the proposal was at best superficial 
because it ignored shadow banks. While he quibbled with the approach taken to rescue 
FDIC (recall that many thrifts had failed and even the largest banks were in trouble in the 
early 1990s), he agreed that deposit insurance had to be strengthened. He argued that   23
weakening Glass Steagall and state limits on branching were trying to “fix something that 
is not broke.” He argued that small- to medium-sized banks are more profitable and 
relation-oriented. In other words, there was no reason to allow or promote the rise of 
hegemonic financial institutions with national markets and broad scope. As many others 
have long argued, the economies of scale associated with banking are achieved at the size 
of relatively small banks. Minsky was not swayed by the Treasury’s argument that banks 
were becoming uncompetitive because they could not branch across state lines or because 
certain practices were prohibited to them. He believed that repealing these constraints 
would simply reduce the profitability of the smaller, relation-oriented banks. However he 
did recognize that the smaller banks would lose market share, anyway, due to 
competition from shadow banks. Hence the solution would not be found in promoting 
bigger, less profitable banks that are not interested in relation-oriented banking. Rather, 
Minsky would allow greater scope to the activities of the small community banks. We 
might call this “intensifying” banking—allowing each small institution to provide a 
greater range of services—as opposed to promoting branching and concentration of 
power in the hands of a few large bank holding companies with a variety of subsidiaries. 
In his proposal for development of the newly independent eastern European 
nations, he argued that the critical problem was to “create a monetary and financial 
system which will facilitate economic development, the emergence of democracy and the 
integration with the capitalist world” (Minsky 1992c: 28). Except for the latter goal, this 
statement applies equally well to promotion of the capital development of the Western 
nations.  
Minsky argued that there are two main ways in which the capital development of 
the economy can be “ill done”: the “Smithian” and the “Keynesian.” The first refers to 
what might be called “misallocation”: the wrong investments are financed. The second 
refers to an insufficiency of investment, which leads to a level of aggregate demand that 
is too low to promote high employment. The 1980s suffered from both, but most 
importantly from inappropriate investment—especially in commercial real estate 
investment. We could say that the 2000s again suffered from “Smithian” ill-done capital 
development because far too much finance flowed into the residential real estate sector. 
In both cases, Minsky would point his finger to securitization. In the 1980s because the   24
thrifts were not holding mortgages, they had funding capacity that flowed into 
commercial real estate; in the 2000s, the mania for risky (high return) asset-backed 
securities fueled subprime lending. In a prescient analysis, Minsky argued that  
 
[b]ecause of the way the mortgages were packaged it was 
possible to sell off a package of mortgages at a premium so that 
the originator and the investment banking firms walked away 
from the deal with a net income and no recourse from the 
holders. The instrument originators and the security underwriters 
did not  hazard any of their wealth on the longer-term viability of 
the  underlying  projects.    Obviously in such packaged financing 
the selection and supervisory functions of lenders and 
underwriters are not as well done as they might be when the 
fortunes of the originators are at hazard over the longer term. 
(Minsky 1992b: 22–23) 
 
The implication is rather obvious: good underwriting is promoted when the 
underwriter is exposed to the longer-term risks. 
This brings us back to Minsky’s skeptical banker: 
 
When we go to the theater we enter into a conspiracy with the 
players to suspend disbelief. The financial developments of the 
1980s [and 1990s and 2000s!] can be viewed as theater: 
promoters and portfolio managers suspended disbelief with 
respect to where the cash would come from that would [validate] 
the projects being financed. Bankers, the designated skeptic in 
the financial structure, placed their critical faculties on hold. As a 
result the capital development was not done well. 
Decentralization of finance may well be the way to reintroduce 
the necessary skepticism. (Minsky 1992a: 37)  
 
Decentralization plus maintaining exposure to risk could reorient institutions back 
toward relationship banking. Unfortunately most trends in recent years have favored 
concentration. The “too big to fail” doctrine that dates back to the problems of 
Continental Illinois gives an obvious advantage to the biggest banks. These are able to 
finance positions at the lowest cost because the government stands behind them. The 
small local banks face higher costs as they try to attract local deposits by opening more 
offices than necessary, and because it costs them more to attract “wholesale” deposits in 
national markets. Even in the case of FDIC-insured deposits (which have no default risk), 
smaller banks pay more simply because of the market perception that they are riskier   25
because the government does not backstop them. As discussed, investment banks are now 
allowed to operate like a hedge fund, but can obtain FDIC-insured deposits and can rely 
on Fed and Treasury protection should risky trades go bad. It is very hard for a small 
bank to compete. 
How can the system be reformed to favor relationship banking that seems to be 
more conducive to promoting the capital development of the economy? First it would be 
useful to reduce government protection for less desirable banking activities. There are 
two important kinds of protection the government currently provides: liquidity and 
solvency. Liquidity is mostly provided by the Fed, which lends reserves at the discount 
window and buys assets (in the past, government debt, but in recent years the Fed has 
bought private debt). Minsky always advocated extension of the discount window 
operations to include a wide range of financial institutions. If the Fed had lent reserves 
without limit to all financial institutions when the crisis first hit, it is probable that the 
liquidity crisis could have been resolved more quickly. Hence, this kind of government 
protection should not be restrained.  
It is the second kind, protection against default, that is more problematic. Deposit 
insurance guarantees there is no default risk on certain classes of deposits—now up to 
$250,000. This is essential for clearing at par and for maintaining a safe and secure 
payments system. There is no good reason to limit the insurance to $250,000, so the cap 
should be lifted. The question is about which types of institutions should be allowed to 
offer such deposits, or, which types of assets would be eligible for financing using 
insured deposits. Some considerations would include riskiness of assets, maturity of 
assets, and whether purchase of the assets fulfills the public purpose—the capital 
development of the economy. Risky assets put the FDIC on the hook since it must pay 
out dollar-for-dollar, but if it resolves a failing institution it will receive only cents on the 
dollar of assets. In his discussion of the Treasury’s proposal for rescuing the FDIC, 
Minsky made it clear that “cost to the Treasury” should not be a major concern (another 
reason for removing the cap—it is not important to limit Treasury’s losses to the first 
$250,000 of a deposit). We can probably also conclude for the same reason that riskiness 
of assets financed through issuing insured deposits should not be the major concern. 
Maturity of the assets is no longer a concern if the Fed stands ready to lend reserves as   26
needed—a bank could always meet deposit withdrawals by borrowing reserves, so it 
would not need to sell longer-term assets. Hence, the major argument for limiting a 
financial institution’s ability to finance positions in assets by issuing insured deposits is 
that the government has a legitimate interest in promoting the public purpose. Banks 
should be prevented from using insured deposits in a manner that causes the capital 
development of the country to be “ill done.” 
Banks that receive government protection in the form of liquidity and (partial) 
solvency guarantees are essentially public-private partnerships. They promote the public 
purpose by specializing in activities that they can perform more competently than 
government can do. One of these is underwriting—assessing credit-worthiness and 
building relations with borrowers that enhance their willingness to repay. Over the past 
decade a belief that underwriting is unnecessary flowered and then exploded. Financial 
institutions discovered that credit-rating scores cannot substitute for underwriting—in 
part because those scores can be manipulated, but also because the elimination of 
relationship banking changes the behavior of borrowers and lenders. This means that past 
default rates become irrelevant (as credit raters have discovered). If banks are not doing 
underwriting, it is difficult to see why government needs them as partners: it would be 
much simpler to have government directly finance activities it perceives to be in the 
public interest—home mortgages, student loans, state and local government 
infrastructure, and even small business activities (commercial real estate and working 
capital expenses). Indeed, there has been a movement in that direction, with government 
taking back control over student loans. When government guarantees both the deposits as 
well as the loans (for example mortgages and student loans) it is difficult to see any role 
to be played by banks except underwriting.  
The problem banks have faced over the past three or four decades is the “cream 
skimming” of their business by shadow banks (or, as Minsky called it, managed money). 
Uninsured checkable deposits in managed funds (such as money market mutual funds) 
offer a higher-earning, but relatively convenient, alternative to insured deposits, allowing 
much of the payments system to bypass banks. As Minsky argued, credit cards have also 
diverted the payments system out of banking (although the larger banks capture a lot of 
the credit card business). At the same time, banks were squeezed on the other side of their   27
balance sheet by the development of the commercial paper market that allows firms to 
borrow short term at interest rates below those on bank loans (sometimes, firms could 
even borrow more cheaply than banks could). Again banks recaptured some of that 
business by earning fees for guaranteeing commercial paper. But these competitive 
pressures caused banks to jettison expensive underwriting and relationship banking, 
replaced by the originate-to-distribute model. 
There is no simple solution to these competitive pressures, although Minsky 
offered some ideas. In several publications Minsky argued that policy should move to 
make the payments system a profit center for banks.  
 
One weakness of the banking system centers around the 
American scheme of paying for the payments system by the 
differential between the return on assets and the interest paid on 
deposits. In general the administration of the checking system 
costs some 3.5% of the amount of deposits subject to check. If 
the checking system were an independent profit center for banks 
then the banks would be in a better position to compete with the 
money funds. (Minsky 1992a: 36)  
 
It is not desirable to try to return to the early postwar period in which banks and 
thrifts monopolized the payment system. However, in the 1800s, the federal government 
eliminated private bank notes by placing a tax on them. In a similar manner, preferential 
treatment of payments made through banks could restore a competitive edge. 
Transactions taxes could be placed on payments made through managed funds. In 
addition, banks could be offered lower, subsidized fees for use of the Fed’s clearing 
system. Minsky also held out some hope that by substituting debit cards for checks, banks 
could substantially lower their costs of operating the payments system—something that 
does seem to be happening (Minsky 1992d). 
Part of the problem today is that the Fed requires that a portion of a bank’s 
funding come from retail deposits. As mentioned above, Minsky argued this causes local 
banks to open more offices than necessary to compete for retail deposits. Recall that part 
of the reason for the New Deal’s Regulation Q was precisely to eliminate competition for 
such deposits, on the belief that competition raised costs of such funds and induced banks 
to purchase riskier assets to cover those costs. The biggest “brand name” banks more 
easily attract retail deposits, and they also have the advantage that they are believed to be   28
safer. For this reason, Warren Mosler has called for elimination of any requirement that 
banks maintain any specified proportion of their funding in the form of retail deposits. 
Combined with Minsky’s argument that banks should be able to borrow reserves on 
demand at the Fed, this means bank costs of funds would be the Fed’s overnight interest 
rate—plus any “frown costs.”  
Some, including Minsky’s Levy colleague Ronnie Phillips, have called for a 
return to the 100% money proposal of Irving Fisher and Milton Friedman. Deposit-
issuing banks would be allowed to hold only Fed reserves and Treasury debt as assets. 
Minsky argued that this loses  
 
sight of the main object: the capital development of the 
economy. The key role of banking is lending or, better, 
financing. The questions to be asked of any financial system are 
what do the assets of banks and other financial institutions 
represent, is the capital development of the economy better 
served if the proximate financiers are decentralized local 
institutions, and should the stricture lean towards 
compartmentalized or broad jurisdiction institutions? (Minsky 
1992a: 36–37)  
 
To be sure, Minsky did not categorically reject the narrow bank proposal (indeed, he 
wrote a supportive note for the book by Phillips)—he simply believed it addresses only a 
peripheral problem, safety and soundness of the payments and savings systems. It does 
not address promotion of the capital development of the economy. 
Recall from above that there is the “Smithian” problem and the “Keynesian” 
problem: banks might finance the wrong projects and might not finance the right amount. 
Opening the discount window to provide an elastic supply of reserve funding ensures that 
banks can finance positions in as many assets as they desire at the Fed’s target rate (as 
discussed above, the Fed would lend reserves on demand and would remove any 
requirement that banks finance a portion of their positions in assets using retail deposits). 
This does not ensure that we have solved the Keynesian problem, because banks might 
finance too much or too little activity to achieve full employment. Offering unlimited 
funding to them deals only with the liability side of banking, but leaves the asset side 
open. It is somewhat easier to resolve the “too much” part of the Keynesian problem 
because the Fed or other bank regulators can impose constraints on bank purchases of   29
assets when it becomes apparent that they are financing too much activity. For example, 
in the past real estate boom it was obvious (except, apparently, to mainstream economists 
and too many at the Fed) that lending should be curtailed.  
The problem is that the orthodox response to too much lending is to raise the 
Fed’s target rate. And because borrowing is not very interest sensitive, especially in a 
euphoric boom, rates must rise sharply to have much effect. Further, raising rates 
conflicts with the Fed’s goal of maintaining financial stability because—as the Volcker 
experiment showed—interest rate hikes that are sufficiently large to kill a boom also are 
large enough to cause severe financial disruption (something like three-quarters of all 
thrifts were driven to insolvency). In fact, Minsky argued that the early 1990s banking 
crisis was in part due to the aftermath of the Volcker experiment of a decade earlier. 
Indeed, this recognition is part of the reason that the Greenspan/Bernanke Fed turned to 
“gradualism”—a series of very small rate hikes that are well-telegraphed. Unfortunately, 
this means that markets have plenty of time to prepare and to compensate for rate hikes, 
which means they have less impact. For these reasons, rate hikes are not an appropriate 
means of controlling bank lending. Instead the controls ought to be direct: raising 
downpayments and collateral requirements, and even issuing cease and desist orders to 
prevent further financing of some activities.  
For a while it was believed that capital requirements are a proper way to regulate 
bank lending: higher capital requirements not only make banks safer, but they also 
constrain bank lending unless the banks can raise capital. Unfortunately, neither claim 
was correct. Higher capital requirements were imposed in the aftermath of the S&L 
fiasco, and codified in the Basel agreements. Rather than constraining bank purchases of 
assets, banks simply moved assets and liabilities off their balance sheets—putting them 
into special purpose vehicles, for example. Basel also used risk-adjusted weightings for 
capital requirements, to encourage banks to hold less risky assets for which they were 
rewarded with lower capital requirements. Unfortunately, banks gamed the system in two 
ways: a) since risk weightings were by class, banks would take the riskiest positions in 
each class; and b) banks worked with credit-ratings agencies to structure assets such as 
MBSs to achieve the risk weighting desired. For example, it was relatively easy to get 
triple-A-rated tranches (as safe as sovereign government debt) out of packages of   30
subprime and “liar loan” Alt-A mortgages—with 85–90% of the risky mortgages 
underlying investment-grade tranches. Finally, Minsky (1986) argued that all else equal, 
high capital ratios necessarily reduce return on equity (and, hence growth of net worth), 
so it is not necessarily true that higher capital ratios increase safety of banks because it 
means they are less profitable. Indeed, with higher capital ratios they need to choose a 
higher risk/return portfolio of assets to achieve a target return on equity. Again, if 
regulators want to constrain the rate of growth of lending, it appears that direct credit 
controls are better. 
On the other hand, there is not much that can be done to encourage banks to lend 
when they do not want to. That is the old “you cannot push on a string” argument, and it 
describes the current situation quite well. Nor should government policy try to get banks 
to make loans they do not want to make! After all, if banks are our underwriters, and if 
their assessment is that there are no good loans to be made, then we should trust their 
judgment. In that case, lending is not the way to stimulate aggregate demand to get the 
economy to move toward fuller employment. Instead, fiscal policy is the way to do it. 
Solving the Smithian problem requires direct oversight of bank activity mostly on 
the asset side of their balance sheet. Financial activities that further the capital 
development of the economy need to be encouraged; those that cause it to be “ill done” 
need to be discouraged. One of the reasons that Minsky wanted the Fed to lend reserves 
to all comers was because he wanted private institutions to be “in the bank”—that is, to 
be debtors to the Fed. As a creditor, the Fed would be able to ask the banker question: 
“how will you repay me?”:  
 
The Federal Reserve’s powers to examine are inherent in its 
ability to lend to banks through the discount window… As a 
lender to banks, either as the normal provider of the reserve base 
to commercial banks (the normal operation prior to the great 
depression) or as the potential lender of last resort, central banks 
have a right to knowledge about the balance sheet, income and 
competence of their clients, banks and bank managements. This 
is no more than any bank believes it has the right to know about 
its clients. (Minsky 1992d: 10)  
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The Fed would ask to see evidence for the cash flow that would generate ability 
of the bank to service loans. It is common practice for a central bank to lend against 
collateral, using a “haircut” to favor certain kinds of assets (for example, a bank might be 
able to borrow one hundred cents on the dollar against government debt but only seventy-
five cents against a dollar of mortgages). Collateral requirements and haircuts can be used 
to discipline banks—to influence the kinds of assets they purchase. Examination of the 
bank’s books also allows the Fed to look for risky practices and to keep abreast of 
developments. It is clear that the Fed was caught with its pants down, so to speak, by the 
crisis that began in 2007 in part because it mostly supplied reserves in open market 
operations rather than at the discount window. Forcing private banks “into the bank” 
gives the Fed more leverage over their activities. For this reason Minsky opposed the 
Treasury’s proposal to strip the Fed of some of its responsibilities for regulation and 
oversight of institutions. If anything, Minsky would have increased the Fed’s role and 
would use the discount window as an important tool for oversight.  
His views are relevant to current discussions about the creation of the “super” 
systemic regulator, and he probably would have sided with those who want to increase 
the Fed’s power. He also believed that because “a central bank needs to have business, 
supervisory, and examination relations with banks and markets if it is to be 
knowledgeable about what is happening,” reducing its responsibility for examining and 
supervising banks would also inhibit its “ability to perform its monetary policy function. 
This is so because monetary policy operations are constrained by the Federal Reserve’s 
views of the effect such operations would have upon bank activities and market stability” 
(Minsky 1992d: 10). The Fed would be better informed to the extent that it supervised 
and examined banks. 
Minsky worried that the trend to megabanks “may well allow the weakest part of 
the system, the giant banks, to expand, not because they are efficient but because they can 
use the clout of their large asset base and cash flows to make life uncomfortable for local 
banks: predatory pricing and corners [of the market] cannot be ruled out in the American 
context” (Minsky 1992d: 12). Further, since the size of loans depends on capital base, big 
banks have a natural affinity for the “big deals,” while small banks service smaller 
clients: “A one-billion-dollar bank may well have eighty-million dollars in capital. It   32
therefore would have an eight- to twelve-million dollar maximum line of credit […] in 
the United States context this means the normal client for such banks is a community or 
smaller business: such banks are small business development corporations” (Minsky 
1992d: 12). 
For this reason, Minsky advocated a proactive government policy to create and 
support small community development banks (CDBs) (Minsky et al. 1993). Very briefly, 
the argument advanced was that the capital development of the nation and of 
communities is fostered via the provision of a broad range of financial services. 
Unfortunately, many communities, lower income consumers, and smaller and start-up 
firms are inadequately provisioned with these services. For example, in many 
communities there are far more check-cashing outlets and pawnshops than bank offices. 
Many households do not even have checking accounts. Small businesses often finance 
activities using credit card debt. Hence, the proposal would have created a network of 
small community development banks to provide a full range of services (a sort of 
universal bank for underserved communities), such as: 1) a payment system for check 
cashing and clearing, and credit and debit cards; 2) secure depositories for savings and 
transactions balances; 3) household financing for housing, consumer debts, and student 
loans; 4) commercial banking services for loans, payroll services, and advice; 5) 
investment banking services for determining the appropriate liability structure for the 
assets of a firm, and placing these liabilities; and 6) asset management and advice for 
households (Minsky et al. 1993: 10–11). The institutions would be kept small, local, and 
profitable. They would be public-private partnerships, with a new Federal Bank for 
Community Development Banks created to provide equity and to charter and supervise 
the CDBs. Each CDB would be organized as a bank holding company; one example of its 
composition would be: a) a narrow bank to provide payments services; b) a commercial 
bank to provide loans to firms and mortgages to households; c) an investment bank to 
intermediate equity issues and long-term debt of firms; and d) a trust bank to act as a 
trustee and to provide financial advice.  
Reform of the financial system does need to address the “shadow banks” of 
money manager capitalism. Minsky believed, as discussed above, that pension funds 
were largely responsible for the LBO boom (and bust) of the 1980s; similarly there is   33
strong evidence that pension funds drove the commodities boom and bust of the mid-
2000s. To be sure, this is just a part of managed money, but it is a government-protected 
and supported portion—both because it gets favorable tax treatment and because it has a 
quasi-government backing through the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (see 
Nersisyan and Wray [2010]). Hence, it is yet another public-private partnership that 
ought to serve the public purpose. Minsky wondered “Should the power of pension funds 
be attenuated by having open ended IRA’s? (No limit to contributions, withdrawals 
without penalty, but all withdrawals taxed, interest and dividend accruals not taxed 
except as they are spent)” (Minsky 1992a: 35). The IRAs would compete with pension 
fund managers, reducing their influence. 
Finally, returning to Minsky’s views on the role that financial institutions play in 
forcing and allocating a surplus, he would certainly be appalled at recent trends. First, 
there has been an important shift away from the wage share and toward gross capital 
income. I will not go into all the implications of this, but it is clear that stagnant wages 
played a role in promoting growth of household indebtedness over the past three decades, 
with rapid acceleration since the mid-1990s. As many at the Levy Institute have been 
arguing since 1996, the shift to a private sector deficit that was unprecedentedly large and 
persistent would prove to be unsustainable. The mountains of debt still crushing 
households is in part due to the shift of national income away from wages as households 
tried to maintain living standards. Equally problematic is the allocation of profits toward 
the financial sector—just before the crisis, the FIRE sector got 40% of all corporate 
profits and its share has returned to that level. This contrasts with a 10 to 15% share until 
the 1970s, and a 20% share until the 1990s. While value added by the FIRE sector also 
grew, from about 12% in the early postwar period to nearly 20% today, its share of 
profits was twice as high as its share of value added by the time of the 2000s bubble. 
Hence there are three interrelated problems: the surplus forced by the financial sector is 
probably too large, the share of GDP coming from the financial sector is probably too 
large, and the share of the surplus allocated by the financial sector to itself is far too 
large. Downsizing finance is necessary to ensure that the capital development of the 
economy can be well done. With 40% of corporate profits going to finance, not only does   34
this leave too little to other sectors, but it encourages entrepreneurial effort and 




Over past decades the belief that “markets work to promote the public interest” gained in 
popularity. Minsky questioned: but what if they don’t. Then a system of constraints and 
interventions can work better. He also believed that we need to make “industry” dominate 
over “speculation” (recalling Keynes’s famous dichotomy), and not vice versa, or the 
capital development of the economy will be ill done in two ways: the 
Smithian/Neoclassical way or the Keynes/aggregate demand way. If investment is 
misdirected, we not only waste resources, but we get boom and bust. If investment is too 
low, we not only suffer from unemployment, but also profits are too low to support 
commitments—leading to default. Further, when profits are low in “industry” then 
problems arise in the financial sector because commitments cannot be met. In that case, 
individual profit-seeking behavior leads to incoherent results as financial markets, labor 
markets, and goods markets all react in a manner that causes wages and prices to fall, 
generating a debt deflation. The Smithian ideal is that debt deflations are not endogenous, 
rather they must result from exogenous factors, including too much government 
regulation and intervention, so the solution is deregulation, downsizing government, tax 
cuts, and making markets more flexible. The Keynesian view is that the financial 
structure is transformed over a run of good times from a robust to a fragile state as a 
result of the natural reaction of agents to the successful operation of the economy. If 
policymakers understood this, they could formulate policy to attenuate the 
transformation—and then to deal with a crisis when it occurs.    35
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